

Matter without consciousness united to any Body, makes the same Person. But let him once find himself conscious of any of the Actions of *Nestor*, he then finds himself the same Person with *Nestor*.

§ 15. And thus we may be able without any difficulty to conceive, the same Person at the Resurrection, though in a Body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here, the same consciousness going along with the Soul that inhabits it. But yet the Soul alone in the change of Bodies, would scarce to any one, but to him that makes the Soul the *Man*, be enough to make the same  
10 *Man*. For should the Soul of a Prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the Prince's past Life, enter and inform the Body of a Cobler as soon as deserted by his own Soul, every one sees, he would be the same Person with the Prince, accountable only for the Prince's Actions: But who would say it was the same Man? The  
15 Body too goes to the making the Man, and would, I guess, to every Body determine the Man in this case, wherein the Soul, with all its Princely Thoughts about it, would not make another Man: But he would be the same Cobler to every one besides himself. I know that in the ordinary way of speaking, the same Person, and the same  
20 Man, stand for one and the same thing. And indeed every one will always have a liberty to speak, as he pleases, and to apply what articulate Sounds to what *Ideas* he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleases. But yet when we will enquire, what makes the same *Spirit*, *Man*, or *Person*, we must fix the *Ideas* of *Spirit*, *Man*, or  
25 *Person*, in our Minds; and having resolved with our selves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine, in either of them, or the like, when it is the *same*, and when not.

§ 16. But though the same immaterial Substance, or Soul does not alone, where-ever it be, and in whatsoever State, make the same  
30 Man; yet 'tis plain consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended, should it be to Ages past, unites Existences, and Actions, very remote in time, into the same Person, as well as it does the Existence and Actions of the immediately preceding moment: So that what-ever has the consciousness of present and past Actions, is the same  
35 Person to whom they both belong. Had I the same consciousness,

§ 16. *Consciousness makes the same Person.*

(5), the ... Resurrection] 4-5 | at the Resurrection the same Person 2-3  
(6) which] *add.* 4-5 (17-18) he ... besides] 4-5 | it would to every one be  
the same Coblér beside 2-3 (24) [2nd] *Spirit*] 2er-5 | *Spirits* 2 (29) -ever]  
*v. Register* (31) Actions,] 4-5 | Actions 2-3 (l. below 35) makes] 2-3 | make 4-5

that I saw the Ark and *Noah's* Flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the *Thames* last Winter, or as that I write now, I could no more doubt that I, that write this now, that saw the *Thames* overflow'd last Winter, and that view'd the Flood at the general Deluge, was  
5 the same *self*, place that *self* in what Substance you please, than that I that write this am the same *my self* now whilst I write (whether I consist of all the same Substance, material or immaterial, or no) that I was Yesterday. For as to this point of being the same *self*, it matters not whether this present *self* be made up of the same or  
10 other Substances, I being as much concern'd, and as justly accountable for any Action was done a thousand Years since, appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am, for what I did the last moment.

§ 17. *Self* is that conscious thinking thing, (whatever Substance, made up of whether Spiritual, or Material, Simple, or Compounded, 15 it matters not) which is sensible, or conscious of Pleasure and Pain, capable of Happiness or Misery, and so is concern'd for it *self*, as far as that consciousness extends. Thus every one finds, that whilst comprehended under that consciousness, the little Finger is as much a part of it *self*, as what is most so. Upon separation of this  
20 little Finger, should this consciousness go along with the little Finger, and leave the rest of the Body, 'tis evident the little Finger would be the *Person*, the *same Person*; and *self* then would have nothing to do with the rest of the Body. As in this case it is the consciousness that goes along with the Substance, when one part is  
25 separated from another, which makes the same *Person*, and constitutes this inseparable *self*: so it is in reference to Substances remote in time. That with which the *consciousness* of this present thinking thing can join it self, makes the same *Person*, and is one *self*  
30 with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to it *self*, and owns all the Actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no farther; as every one who reflects will perceive.

§ 18. In this *personal Identity* is founded all the Right and Justice of Reward and Punishment; Happiness and Misery, being that, for

§ 17. *Self depends on Consciousness.* §§ 18-20. *Object of Reward and Punishment.*

(1) [2nd] that] *add.* 3-5 (12) self-consciousness] *Coste adds a marginal linguistic note.* (14) Substance, /] 2-3, 5 | Substance / 4 (23) *self*] 2-3 (*likewise Coste*) | *self* 4-5 (26) separated] 2-3 (*likewise Coste*) | separate 4-5  
(27) Substances] 2-4 | Substance 5 (27-32) : so ... time. That ... farther;] 4-5 | . So ... time, that ... farther, 2-3 (34) Punishment;] 4-5 | Punishment, 2-3 (l. below 34: §§ 18-20.) Punishment.] 2-3 | Punishments 4-5

which every one is concerned for *himself*, not mattering what becomes of any Substance, not joined to, or affected with that consciousness. For as it is evident in the instance I gave but now, if the consciousness went along with the little Finger, when it was cut  
5 off, that would be the same *self* which was concerned for the whole Body Yesterday, as making a part of it *self*, whose Actions then it cannot but admit as its own now. Though if the same Body should still live, and immediately from the separation of the little Finger have its own peculiar consciousness, whereof the little Finger knew  
10 nothing, it would not at all be concerned for it, as a part of it *self*, or could own any of its Actions, or have any of them imputed to him.

§ 19. This may shew us wherein *personal Identity* consists, not in the Identity of Substance, but, as I have said, in the Identity of *consciousness*, wherein, if *Socrates* and the present Mayor of *Quinborough*  
15 agree, they are the same Person: If the same *Socrates* waking and sleeping do not partake of the same *consciousness*, *Socrates* waking and sleeping is not the same Person. And to punish *Socrates* waking, for what sleeping *Socrates* thought, and waking *Socrates* was never conscious of, would be no more of Right, than to punish one Twin  
20 for what his Brother-Twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for such Twins have been seen.

§ 20. But yet possibly it will still be objected, suppose I wholly lose the memory of some parts of my Life, beyond a possibility of  
25 retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them again; yet am I not the same Person, that did those Actions, had those Thoughts, that I was once conscious of, though I have now forgot them? To which I answer, that we must here take notice what the Word *I* is applied to, which in this case is the Man only.  
30 And the same Man being presumed to be the same Person, *I* is easily here supposed to stand also for the same Person. But if it be possible for the same Man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same Man would at different times make different Persons; which, we see, is the  
35 Sense of Mankind in the solemnest Declaration of their Opinions, Humane Laws not punishing the *Mad Man* for the *Sober Man*'s Actions, nor the *Sober Man* for what the *Mad Man* did, thereby making them two Persons; which is somewhat explained by our

(14) Mayor of *Quinborough*] Coste 'Roy de *Mogol*'  
(30) , I] 3-5 | I, 2

(23) I] *add.* 2er-5

way of speaking in *English*, when we say such an one *is not himself*, or *is besides himself*; in which Phrases it is insinuated, as if those who now, or, at least, first used them, thought, that *self* was changed, the *self* same Person was no longer in that Man.

§ 21. But yet 'tis hard to conceive, that *Socrates* the same individual Man should be two Persons. To help us a little in this, we must consider what is meant by *Socrates*, or the same individual *Man*.  
5

*First*, It must be either the same individual, immaterial, thinking Substance: In short, the same numerical Soul, and nothing else.

*Secondly*, Or the same Animal, without any regard to an im-  
material Soul. 10

*Thirdly*, Or the same immaterial Spirit united to the same Animal.

Now take which of these Suppositions you please, it is impossible to make *personal Identity* to consist in any thing but consciousness; or reach any farther than that does.  
15

For by the First of them, it must be allowed possible that a Man born of different Women, and in distant times, may be the same Man. A way of speaking, which whoever admits, must allow it possible, for the same Man to be two distinct Persons, as any two that have lived in different Ages without the knowledge of one  
20 another's Thoughts.

By the Second and Third, *Socrates* in this Life, and after it, cannot be the same Man any way, but by the same consciousness; and so making *Humane Identity* to consist in the same thing wherein we place *Personal Identity*, there will be no difficulty to allow the same  
25 Man to be the same Person. But then they who place *Humane Identity* in consciousness only, and not in something else, must consider how they will make the Infant *Socrates* the same Man with *Socrates* after the Resurrection. But whatsoever to some Men makes a *Man*, and consequently the same individual Man, wherein per-  
30 haps few are agreed, *personal Identity* can by us be placed in nothing but consciousness (which is that alone which makes what we call *self*) without involving us in great Absurdities.

§ 22. But is not a Man Drunk and Sober the same Person, why else is he punish'd for the Fact he commits when Drunk, though he  
35 be never afterwards conscious of it? Just as much the same Person, as a Man that walks, and does other things in his sleep, is the same Person, and is answerable for any mischief he shall do in it. Humane

§§ 21, 22. *Difference between Identity of Man and Person.*

(2) , as] 4-5 | as 2-3

(9) Substance:] 2-3, 5 | Substance; 4

which he comes to be happy or miserable now. In all which account of *self*, the same numerical Substance is not considered, as making the same *self*: But the same continued consciousness, in which several Substances may have been united, and again separated from it, which, whilst they continued in a vital union with that, wherein this consciousness then resided, made a part of that same *self*. Thus any part of our Bodies vitally united to that, which is conscious in us, makes a part of our *selves*: But upon separation from the vital union, by which that consciousness is communicated, that, which a moment since was part of our *selves*, is now no more so, than a part of another Man's *self* is a part of me; and 'tis not impossible, but in a little time may become a real part of another Person. And so we have the same numerical Substance become a part of two different Persons; and the same Person preserved under the change of various Substances. Could we suppose any Spirit wholly stripp'd of all its memory or consciousness of past Actions, as we find our Minds always are of a great part of ours, and sometimes of them all, the union or separation of such a Spiritual Substance would make no variation of personal Identity, any more than that of any Particle of Matter does. Any Substance vitally united to the present thinking Being, is a part of that very *same self* which now is. Any thing united to it by a consciousness of former Actions makes also a part of the *same self*, which is the same both then and now.

§ 26. *Person*, as I take it, is the name for this *self*. Where-ever a Man finds, what he calls *himself*, there I think another may say is the same *Person*. It is a Forensick Term appropriating Actions and their Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law, and Happiness and Misery. This personality extends it *self* beyond present Existence to what is past, only by consciousness, whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to it *self* past Actions, just upon the same ground, and for the same reason, that it does the present. All which is founded in a concern for Happiness: the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness, that which is conscious of Pleasure and Pain, desiring, that that *self*, that is conscious, should be happy. And therefore whatever past Actions it cannot reconcile or appropriate to that present *self* by consciousness, it can be no more concerned in, than if they had never been done: And to receive Pleasure or Pain; *i.e.* Reward or Punishment,

§§ 26, 27. *Person a Forensick Term.*

(19) Particle] 4-5 | Particles 2-3 (28) [2nd] and] 4-5 | or 2-3 (likewise Coste)

on the account of any such Action, is all one, as to be made happy or miserable in its first being, without any demerit at all. For supposing a Man punish'd now, for what he had done in another Life, whereof he could be made to have no consciousness at all, what difference is there between that Punishment, and being created miserable? And therefore conformable to this, the Apostle tells us, that at the Great Day, when every one shall receive according to his doings, the secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open.\* The Sentence shall be justified by the consciousness all Persons shall have, that they themselves in what Bodies soever they appear, or what Substances soever that consciousness adheres to, are the *same*, that committed those Actions, and deserve that Punishment for them.

§ 27. I am apt enough to think I have in treating of this Subject made some Suppositions that will look strange to some Readers, and possibly they are so in themselves. But yet I think, they are such, as are pardonable in this ignorance we are in of the Nature of that thinking thing, that is in us, and which we look on as our *selves*. Did we know what it was, or how it was tied to a certain System of fleeting Animal Spirits; or whether it could, or could not perform its Operations of Thinking and Memory out of a Body organized as ours is; and whether it has pleased God, that no one such Spirit shall ever be united to any but one such Body, upon the right Constitution of whose Organs its Memory should depend, we might see the Absurdity of some of those Suppositions I have made. But taking, as we ordinarily now do, (in the dark concerning these Matters) the Soul of a Man, for an immaterial Substance, independent from Matter, and indifferent alike to it all, there can from the Nature of things, be no Absurdity at all, to suppose, that the same Soul may, at different times be united to different Bodies, and with them make up, for that time, one Man; As well as we suppose a part of a Sheep's Body yesterday should be a part of a Man's Body tomorrow, and in that union make a vital part of *Melibæus* himself as well as it did of his Ram.

§ 28. To conclude, whatever Substance begins to exist, it must, during its Existence, necessarily be the same: Whatever Compositions of Substances begin to exist, during the union of those

§ 28. *The difficulty from ill use of Names.*

(6-7), that] add. 4-5 (25) these] 2er-5 | those 2 (1. below 35) In Coste, §§ 28, 29 come under the same marginal summary as that for §§ 26, 27.

\* cf. 1 Cor. 14: 25 and 2 Cor. 5: 10.